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Drucilla Cornell's book The Philosophy of the Limit has for
a long time been an important referencepoint in attempting to
understand the relation between deconstruction and law. This
article examines some of the themes discussed by Cornell in this
influential book. The article specifically evaluates the
translation of Derrida's thinking into law as argued for by
Cornell and concludes from this reading that Cornell to some
extent misrepresents and also unnecessarily "tames" Derrida's
thinking. Instead of leading to the radical transformation of
law and society, Cornell's book gives support to an
understanding of the relation between law and justice that is
unlikely to have this effect. The article expounds a different
reading of deconstruction based on a number of Derridean
texts and argues that Derrida's thinking poses a more radical
challenge to law than that presented by Cornell.
Le livre The Philosophy of the Limit de Drucilla Cornell est
depuis longtemps un point de refdrence important pour tenter
de comprendre la relation entre la dconstruction et le droit.
Cet article examine quelques-uns des thmes que discute
Cornell dans ce livre imposant. Plus exactement l'auteur porte
un jugement sur le transfert de la pensie de Derrida vers le
droit tel que le soutient Cornell et en conclut que jusqu'a un
certain point, Cornell donne une impression incorrecte de la
pensie de Derrida et 4 att6nue- sans n6cessiti Plut6t que de
mener a la transformation radicale du droit et de la societ6, le
livre de Cornell appuie une conception de la relation entre le
droit et la justice qui rend un tel effet improbable. L'article
prisente une interpritation diffrente de la ddconstruction basie
sur un nombre de textes de Derrida et soutient que la pensie de
Derrida lance au droit un defi plus radical que celui que
prisente Cornell.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Cornell's wonderful and influential book, The Philosophy of the Limit,' she
attempts to bring about a fusion between the thoughts of inter alia Derrida
and Levinas.2 Legal scholars are clearly indebted to Cornell for being one of
the first to point out that Derrida is not simply a 'relativist' and that
deconstruction does not entail a method,3 but that there is an "ethical
dimension" to his thinking which had hitherto gone unnoticed. This book
remains one of the most authoritative books on the relation between
deconstruction and law. As it appears from recent contributions to the
Cardozo Law Review,4 the question of the "translation" of Derrida into law
remains a contentious issue. This article, although written many years after
the publication of PoL, aims at contributing towards that debate through a
close reading of PoL in order to ascertain whether its claims (to entail an
accurate reflection of the relation between deconstruction and law) are
justified. In other words, the question is whether the "translation" of Derrida
into law has been faithfully executed by Cornell.5 My answer to this question
is regrettably to a large extent in the negative. My aim in this article will be to
examine those "inaccuracies" of translation. This is one reading of PoL which
in my view has not been adequately undertaken in spite of a number of
reviews and discussions of this fine book.6 I hope that my reading of PoL will
provide a basis for an alternative translation of Derrida into law.
It could be argued that some of the criticism that is voiced in this article
(assuming that it is accurate) is unfair because many of the Derridean themes
that are referred to here were developed by Derrida only after the publication
of Cornell's book. My response to this charge would be that, as Derrida has
often said, these themes were already evident in his many texts before 1992, z
although perhaps in a less developed form. Even if the criticism voiced in this
article is unfair in the first sense, I believe that my discussion of Cornell's
reading of Derrida is relevant if for no other reason than that it shows the
differences in thinking between her and Derrida on the relation between
deconstruction and law. It must be acknowledged that my task, fourteen years
after the publication of PoL and with the assistance of many more texts of
1 Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit (New York and London: Routledge, 1992)
[Cornell, PoL].
2 See Preface to ibid.
3 See Pierre Schlag, "A Brief Survey of Deconstruction" (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 741 [Schlag,
"Survey"]; and Jack M. Balkin, "Deconstruction's Legal Career (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 719
for respectively an analysis and a defence (of deconstruction as a method).
4 (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 631-845.
5 For reasons of space and competence I refrain in this article from evaluating the accuracy of
Cornell's translation of Levinas into law.
6 See Anne Barbeau Gardiner, "The Philosophy of the Limit" (Winter 1993) 22(2) CLIO 180 for a
review by someone who, because of Cornell's left politics, does not think the book is so "fine".
7 See Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael
Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) at 39 [Derrida, Rogues]; Jacques Derrida et al,
"Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility: A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida" in Richard Kearney
& Mark Dooley eds., Questioning Ethics: Contemporary Debates in Philosophy (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999) 65 at 80-82 [Derrida et al, "Hospitality"].
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Derrida and on Derrida,' is no doubt, in a sense easier than the one Cornell set
for herself in the 1980s and early 1990s, when her "alliance" with Derrida was
most explicit It furthermore can be noted that Cornell, as recently as 2003,
repeated many of her earlier claims espoused in PoL regarding Derrida and law."
My main "charge" against Cornell, as will appear from the discussion
below, is that she "modifies" and "tames" Derrida's radical thinking in
translating it into law. One could argue that this move of Cornell is deliberate;
that she intentionally decides to follow (her reading of) Levinas (and in this
way go "beyond" Derrida) in synchronizing "the affirmation of the Saying
with its negation in the said"" or, stated differently, in aspiring "to enact the
ethical relation."12 Cornell nevertheless still claims to be following Derrida, in
that she will be "attempting to say what Derrida does," and that she will "take
us beyond Derrida's own relative silence."13 She also frequently refers to
"Derrida's philosophy of the limit." 4 The accuracy of these claims has to be
tested." As will appear from the discussion below, I believe that there are a
8 My reliance on secondary texts will of course not be indiscriminate. In support of my reading
of Derrida and criticism of Cornell, I will rely on those texts which, on my reading, remain
very close to Derrida's texts.
9 See note 14 below on the notion of 'alliance' in Cornell's texts.
10 See Drucilla Cornell, "Rethinking Legal Ideals after Deconstruction" in Austin Sarat, Lawrence
Douglas & Martha Merrill Umphrey eds., Laws Madness (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan
Press, 2003) 147. This analysis contains no reference to Derrida's many later texts of the 1990s. In
Drucilla Cornell, Between Women and Generations: Legacies of Dignity (Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 2005), a hauntingly beautiful and personal text, Cornell does make reference
to a few of Derrida's later texts [Cornell, Between Women]. This is also the case in Drucilla
Cornell, "Derrida. The Gift of the Future" (2005) 16 (3) Differences: A Journal of Feminist
Cultural Studies 68 where Cornell reflects on some of the reactions to Derrida's death.
11 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 89.
12 Ibid. at 84. See also at 64 where Cornell states that instead of preferring one to the other, she
will read Derrida and Levinas together in order to enact a non-violent relation to otherness.
The ethical relation is at times linked to the utopianism that Cornell detects (wrongly, in my
view) in Derrida's thinking; see at 8, 186 fn 13. A discussion of utopianism and its relation to
deconstruction follows below.
13 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 90.
14 Ibid. at 130, 138 and 178. It is interesting to note that in some of her other publications Cornell
criticizes Derrida or expressly indicates her disagreement with Derrida; see e.g., Drucilla
Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and the Law (New York
and London: Routledge, 1991) 96, 110, 118 [Cornell, Beyond Accommodation]; and Cornell,
"Rethinking Legal Ideals after Deconstruction" supra note 10, at 164 on points similar to those
discussed in PoL which are attributed to Derrida and incorporated within the model presented
in PoL. In Beyond Accommodation at 96-97 Cornell presents her approach as merely "an
alliance" with deconstruction. This is not the case in PoL. Cornell has explained her use of the
notion of "alliance" in an interview with Penny Florence; see Drucilla Cornell, "Toward the
Domain of Freedom: Interview with Drucilla Cornell by Penny Florence" in Cynthia Willet
ed., Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 219,
at 230. Cornell notes here that she would never call herself "a Derridean" and that she refuses
to keep her alliances with different male philosophers "neat". This implies both an
identification and a dis-identification with the philosopher concerned.
15 Cornell herself daims that Critical Legal Studies has 'misappropriated' and 'misinterpreted'
Derrida (Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 100). She also criticizes other feminists for making the
"mistake" of directly translating deconstruction "into a 'positive' political or legal programme"
of a "tolerance of difference" (Ibid. at 103-105, 181). Like Cornell, I do not believe that there is
only one way in which Derrida can be translated into law, but that there are more and less
accurate ways of doing this. Cornell's attempt is dearly more accurate than those of others,
Vo. 25. (1)
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number of problems with this approach, apart from the fact that it does not
remain true to Derrida. Despite its declared aims, this article should not be
read or understood as simply a theoretical exercise in purity, but as a reflection
on how "best" to respond to the injunction of unconditional justice which we
have inherited from the tradition.
The discussion below will proceed by focusing on and discussing a number
of themes in PoL and ascertaining in each instance how this corresponds with
Derrida's thinking. Reference will also be made to some of Cornell's other
texts to get as clear an understanding of her thinking as possible. First,
however, an overview will be given of the central themes of PoL.
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE LIMIT AND DECONSTRUCTION
PoL claims to be an interpretation of deconstruction, which Cornell
renames "the philosophy of the limit". This renaming, she claims, indicates
more clearly what deconstruction is really about. It also aims at reflecting the
relationship between Derrida and Levinas's ethics of aterity.16 The notion of
the "limit" in this renaming exercise is required, Cornell says, because she
wishes to retain the notion of an ideal towards which we should strive. The
"limit" indicates that an ideal can never be said to represent the "truth" or
claim that it is "just." In the words of Cornell:
This book will attempt to reformulate the juridical and legal
significance of this recognition of the limits of idealism, if
idealism is understood to give us a system that can successfully
incorporate what is other to the system and thereby erase the
system's contradictions."x
The theme of the limit is also evident in the following passage:
The Law of Law [or the Good] calls us to interpretation
through an appeal to justice, and this process of interpretation
also projects the good of the community, which is itself only an
interpretation and not the last word on what the good of the
community actually could be."8
but, as stated before, I believe that her attempt suffers from serious shortcomings. Rodolphe
Gasch6, The Tain of the Miror (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard
University Press, 1986) at 7-8 explains the notions of "truth" and "accuracy' insofar as readings
of Derrida's (open) texts are concerned as follows: "Derrida's philosophy...is plural, yet not
pluralistic in the liberal sense....This plural nature, or openness, of Derrida's philosophy makes
it thoroughly impossible to conceive of his work in terms of orthodoxy...primarily because it
resists any possible closure, and thus doctrinal rigidity, for essential reasons. Still, such
openness and pluralism do not give license to a free interpretation of Derrida's thought, or for
its adaptation to any particular need or interest. Nor are all the interpretations of Derrida's
thought that seek legitimacy in such openness equally valid" [Gasch6, Mirror].
16 See Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 in the Preface and at 1 and 110.
17 Ibid. at 2. See also Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, supra note 14 at 169.
18 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 113.
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Cornell's argument in PoL, in summary form, is that the insights of
deconstruction can be relied on to provide us with an approach to legal
decision-making. The model that she constructs on this basis makes provision
for a paradox or "aporia" 9 between the following "orders":
first, the Good. This is a reflection of the ethical relationship of
responsibility for the other and is based on Levinas's thinking. This is a
relation which is asymmetrical in nature. This relation cannot be concretized
within a legal system, but nevertheless commands us, calls us to justice.2"
second, the good. This is a legal order based on the principle of reciprocal
symmetry. This principle is required because the Good cannot be
directly translated into law, as conflicting claims need to be harmonized.
Reciprocal symmetry is the best we have at the moment, even though it
inevitably leads to the disregard of certain others. The legal order with its
conflicting legal principles needs to be interpreted in light of the principle
of reciprocal symmetry. This interpretation entails recollective
imagination. We should look to the past (the "might have been") and
project the principles we find there into the future (the "should be").
These two orders are presented by Cornell as uncrossable.2" In the above
model, Cornell gives expression to her understanding of some of the "ideas"
that she finds in Derrida's texts. These include the other, the remains, the ideal
community, utopia, mourning, memory and responsibility. In what follows,
these notions will be enquired into in more detail.
III. THE OTHER
On the question of "the other" in law, the following passage, where Cornell
gives an exposition of Levinas's thought and with which she appears to agree,
needs to be quoted in full:
The basis of ethics is not identification with those whom we
recognize as like ourselves, instead the ethical relation inheres
in the encounter with the Other, the stranger, whose face
beckons us to heed the call to responsibility. The precedence of
the Other means that my relationship to her is necessarily
asymmetrical. Reciprocity is, at the very most, the affair of the
Other.
19 As we will see in what follows, the relation between these two "orders" in Cornell's model
turns out to not present us with an aporia or a non-road (Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The
'Mystical Foundation of Authority'", trans. by Mary Quaintance in Drucilla Cornell, Michel
Rosenfeld & David Gray Carlson eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (New York
and London: Routledge, 1992) 3 at 16, but instead with hope or an aspiration (Derrida,
Possibility of]ustice].
20 Cornell, PoL, supra note I at 91, 98-100, 105.
21 Ibid. at 157, 166 (also in Cornell, "Rethinking Legal Ideals after Deconstruction" supra note 10
at 150, 162).
VoZ 25. (1)
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In the asymmetrical and yet face-to-face relation with the
Other, the stranger who calls to me, the subject first
experiences the resistance to encapsulation of the "beyond." In
the face-to-face relation we run into the infinity that disrupts
totality. 2
This encounter with the other is closely related to "the Good," as appears
from the following passages:
Through the encounter of the Other who calls me, the subject
first experiences the resistance to encapsulation of the Beyond.
The Law of Law or the Good, is precisely the echo of the Call
of the other as a prescriptive command directed toward the
future that disrupts the Hegelian system and the pretense of
any system to have adequately represented the totality of what
"is" Good. The Law of Law "is" as rupture of the status quo.23
[A]s we have also seen in Levinas, the Good is precisely what
eludes our full knowledge. We cannot grasp the Good but only
follow it as the command of the Other. It is precisely the
Good, the Law of Law, as responsibility to the Other that calls
us to justice."
This understanding of Levinas/Derrida has very important consequences
for Cornell's proposed model for judicial decision-making. Cornell, for
example, says that the judge owes a responsibility to the parties that come to
court ("the actual individuals") and not to the legal system." This leaves her
with a dilemma. In Roe v Wade26 the question then would inevitably arise who
the "other" is that gives us access to infinity: the single, pregnant woman who
instituted the action to have the Texas abortion law declared invalid (and those
who supported her) or those who opposed the action, including the State (or
perhaps, the fetus)?" For Cornell, every person who is involved in a court case
is a potential "other".28 In the criminal context, every convicted criminal is
22 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 66. See also at 99.
23 Ibid. at 98-99.
24 Ibid. at 100.
25 Ibid. at 143. This Cornell compares with the position of Luhmann whose focus is said to be on
the system.
26 (1973) 410 U.S. 113.
27 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 152. Cornell views the fetus as the other "Other" and solves the
dilemma as follows: "Of course, the fetus can itself be recognized as Other, with infinite right.
But whether or not this recognition is to be embodied in law, the Justices must directly
confront the woman as Other, they cannot simply follow along with the system which, as
constituted, allows the rights of women to go unnoticed."
28 For criticism of this approach of Cornell, see also William Rasch, "Immanent Systems,
Transcendental Temptations, and the Limits of Ethics" in William Rasch & Cary Wolfe eds.,
Obsemrng Complexity: Systems Theory and Postmodernity (Minneapolis, MN: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000) 73 at 85-87.
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said to be an "other",' whereas in the civil context, every person who loses a
court case is an "other"."
This approach clearly leaves the ethical relationship with not much of a role
to play in a legal system. The best the legal system can strive for when every
person involved in a court case is a potential other is the reconciliation of all
interests, whilst acknowledging that this is not possible to achieve. 1 On this
interpretation of the relation between "the ethics of alterity" and law, it makes
sense rather to focus on the ideals towards which law should strive or aspire,
because what is required from us in the ethical relation is something
impossible (not the impossible) and therefore largely irrelevant. The ethical
relation and its relation to law conceived as such, also leaves us with
something very close to relativism. If every person involved in a court case is a
potential other who has to be recognized and whose perspective should ideally
be respected, it is safer to ignore "the Good" and focus on the law and that
towards which it should strive. This is clearly not in accordance with
Derrida's thinking. Not only does Derrida insist that every decision, in order
to be responsible, has "to give itself up to the impossible decision,"32 he also
insists that justice is not something which is "Good," at least not for "us"."
Derrida's approach to justice can be compared more favourably with the
words which J.M. Coetzee, in Waiting for the Barbarians,' places in the mouth
of the magistrate of an imperial outpost who had been deposed, assaulted and
incarcerated after contact with the "barbarians". The magistrate manages to
escape from his cell when twelve "barbarians" are captured and brought into
29 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 113. Cornell indicates her agreement with Cover in this respect as
follows: "[F]or Cover, the danger of legal interpretation is that because it purports to heal the rift, it
blinds us to the wound of the fragmentation of ou r so-called community as we violate the
perspective of the Other in the criminal sentence.... The legal system as a mechanism of social
control operates through the inscription of the sentence on the back of its victims."
30 Ibid. at 114: "[W]hen one legal interpretation is vindicated as to what constitutes the good of
the nomos, it is imposed upon the other as if the Good, in the strong sense, had been
achieved."
31 See Drucilla Cornell, Transformations: Recollective Imagination and Sexual Difference (New
York and London: Roudedge, 1993) 35-36 [Cornell, Transformations]: "Synchronization...points
us to the real problem: How do we develop an institutional analysis which allows us not only
to synchronize the competing rights of individuals, but also the conflicts between the
individual and the community, and between different groups in society? The goal of a modern
legal system is synchronization and not rational coherence. Synchronization recognizes that
there are competing rights situations and real conflicts between the individual and the
community, which may not be able to yield a "coherent" whole. The conflicts may be
mediated and synchronized but not eradicated. In Dworkin, rational coherence depends on the
community acting as a single speaker. In reality, a complex, differentiated community can
never be reduced to a single voice. Synchronization recognizes the inevitable complexity of the
modern state and the imperfection of all our attempted solutions." See also Cornell, PoL, supra
note 1 at 137: "The Other is other to the system. Incorporation into the system is the denial of
the Other." This approach shows a number of similarities with the ethics of "comprehensive
pluralism" of Michel Rosenfeld, "Derrida's Ethical Turn and America: Looking Back from the
Crossroads of Global Terrorism and the Enlightenment" (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 815.
Rosenfeld contrasts his approach with Derrida's "ethics of difference." On my reading,
Rosenfeld does not show an adequate understanding of the notion of "singularity" in Derrida's
thinking.
32 Derrida, Possibility ofJustice, supra note 19, at 24.
33 See further para. VI below.
34 (London: Vintage, 1980).
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town. He joins the crowd in viewing the spectacle. The magistrate makes some
kind of attempt to prevent the torture and breaking of bones that are taking
place. He reflects on his actions as follows:
Would I have dared to face the crowd to demand justice for
these ridiculous barbarian prisoners with their backsides in the
air? Justice- once that word is uttered, where will it all end?
Easier to shout No! Easier to be beaten and made a martyr.
Easier to lay my head on a block than to defend the cause of
justice for the barbarians: for where can that argument lead but
to laying down our arms and opening the gates of the town to
the people whose land we have raped? The old magistrate,
defender of the rule of law, enemy in his own way of the State,
assaulted and imprisoned, impregnably virtuous, is not without
his own twinges of doubt.35
The need to identify the other is of course part of the problematic situation
with which one is faced when one attempts to translate Levinas's thought
directly into law.36 There is seldom only one party in court who can be
compared with the face-to-face relation.3" On my reading of Derrida, Cornell's
is a failed attempt to translate the asymmetrical relation to the other into law.
Pointing out some of the differences between Derrida and Levinas will assist
us in evaluating this claim. On Derrida's analysis, what Levinas proposes
regarding the encounter with the other (and which Cornell adopts as part of
her model for decision-making) is not possible - it is an empiricism (an
unmediated mode of experience) which does not take account of language.3"
There is no possibility of an encounter of the other as other.39 The other so
encountered will always be a phenomenon within language.' In other words,
we cannot get outside of language and experience the other as other (and in
this way access infinity).4 This, of course, does not mean that there are no
35 Ibid. at 118. Compare in this respect Jacques Derrida, "Hostipitality" in Gil Anidjar ed., Acts of
Religion (New York and London: Routledge, 2002) 358 at 361 [Derrida, Acts ofReligion]; and
Anne Dufourmantelle & Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2000) 25-27 [Dufourmantelle & Derrida, Of Hospitality]; and
Derrida et al, "Hospitality", supra note 7 at 70-71, on absolute hospitality.
36 The same problems are faced by those who review PoL. Adam Thurschwell, "On the
Threshold of Ethics" (1994) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1607 at 1636-1639 argues, following Cornell,
that all those litigants who lose, whether in civil or criminal cases are others. This is contested,
at least partly, by Elizabeth Weed, "Reading at the Limit" (1994) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1671 at
1681 fn 41 who notes that she disagrees "with Thurschwell's characterization of convicted
criminals as Others to the law; they may be losers but they are not necessarily Others."
37 See also Schlag, "Survey", supra note 3 at 749-751.
38 In Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, supra note 14 at 26-31 Cornell agrees with Derrida in this
respect in her discussion of Husserl and phenomenology.
39 Jacques Derrida, Paper Machine, trans. By Rachel Bowiby (Stanford. Stanford University Press,
2005) 144 [Derrida, Paper Machine]; Derrida eta!, "Hospitality", supra note 7 at 71.
40 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas"
in Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London and New York:
Routledge 2001 ed.) 97 at 190.
41 Drucilla Cornell, "Rethinking the Beyond within the Real (Response to Rasch)" in Rasch &
Wolfe, supra note 28, 99 at 105 has more recently noted that she has become critical of her "own
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encounters with actual persons, whether in daily life or in law. However,
using the terminology of "the other" in law as a reference to persons or parties
leads to all kinds of problems. As we saw above, the question almost
inevitably arises 'which one of the two or more parties is the other?' The
reason for Derrida's argument that we cannot encounter the other as other is
to emphasize that we always tend to view and treat those we encounter
through an appropriation from within our own privileged and self-serving
perspective or paradigm. However, he does not dismiss Levinas's insistence on
asymmetry. Translated into law, we can say that a case is always viewed from
within the terminology and prejudices which form part of the legal tradition,
with property interests usually playing a predominant role. A case nevertheless
provides an opening, a chance for asymmetry, unconditional justice. Therefore
a case "is" and "is" not, a pure event, an event which gives justice a chance.42 On
the one hand, the legal tradition provides for its own application to the case in
accordance with norms or principles (the conditional), thereby neutralizing the
event, approaching it from out of some horizon.43 On the other hand, an
analysis of the legal tradition shows that it contains within itself an injunction
of unconditional justice, of allowing the impossible event.' The latter would
require that we not approach the future, that which happens, with conditions
and from a horizon, as a "case" to which the law is to be "applied".45 Justice
"is" completely without self-interest. Derrida speaks of justice in the same
breath as absolute hospitality and the perfect gift.'
appropriation of Immanuel (sic) Levinas, on which I rely in The Philosophy of the Limit, to
represent the ethical as the beyond within the real" (105). This distancing from Levinas has on my
reading more to do with Cornell's reading of Levinas's representation of the feminine than with
his position that the (encounter with) the other gives access to infinity. Cornell still states that it is
the other to the system who as observer can view the system as system and as delimited by virtue
of her "very outside or marginalized position against that system" (104). It is furthermore "the
'beyond within the real' and the delimitation of the system by its other that keeps open the space
for the ethical and political challenge to what 'is' because what 'is' is never simply there" (104).
One can say that the other as subject or as "observer" in Cornell's model still has (or at least gives)
access to the beyond within the real. See also Drucilla Cornell, "Civil Disobedience and
Deconstruction" in Nancy J. Holland ed., Feminist Interpretations of Jacques Derrida (University
Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 152-153 where she relies on
Levinas to explain Derrida's intervention into Lacan. She states here, consistent with the above,
that "Levinas's messianic conception of justice demands the recognition of the call of the Other,
which always remains a call and can never be fully answered."
42 See Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 135, 143-144. This of course applies not only to a court
case, but to (almost) any kind of legal writing (including the enactment of legislation).
43 See also ibid. at 151-152. What Pierre Legrand, "Paradoxically, Derrida For a Comparative
Legal Studies" (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 631 at 649 says of Ktz's book (Konrad Zweigert and
Hein Kbtz, Introduction to Comparative Law, trans. by Tony Weir, 3d ed. (Oxford- Clarendon
Press, 1998) can also be said of the traditional approach to the application of law: "It reveals
'the desire to be all-powerful, to control the meanings of experience before encounter so as not
to be overwhelmed.'"
44 Derrida, Possibility ofJustice, supra note 19.
45 See Jacques Derrida, "Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides: A Dialogue with Jacques
Derrida" in Giovanni Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jfirgen Hahermas
and Jacques Derrida (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) 85-91 for a
deconstruction of the concept of an event.
46 See Derrida et al, "Hospitality", supra note 7 at 68-69.
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Although there are a number of references to "the other" and to "others" in
Force of Law, specifically with reference to Levinas,47 Derrida clearly views a
.case" as an "event" which gives a chance for justice:
'Perhaps," one must always say perhaps for justice. There is an
avenir for justice and there is no justice except to the degree
that some event is possible which, as event, exceeds calculation,
rules, programs, anticipations and so forth. Justice as the
experience of absolute alterity is unpresentable, but it is the
chance of the event and the condition of history.4
It would, in my view, perhaps be less confusing in the legal context to speak
of the event or the arrivant (that which or who comes),49 rather than "the
other," when we think of how deconstruction can be 'translated" into law.s A
focus on the event, rather than on some specific 'other", would allow us to
rethink without calculation many of the injustices in law, including those with
regard to women, the environment, 'animals," immigration, children,
religious and other minority groups, as well as economic injustices and the
injustices of the criminal justice system.5 This would also allow us to think of
a 'case" that comes to court as the chance for a unique event, providing a
chance for, as well as a risk of, unconditional justice. To speak as Cornell does
of a reconciliation of interests as that which we should strive towards, even if
regarded as impossible, gives legitimacy to those interests (usually situated on
the political right) which fundamentally oppose and wish to restrict to the
greatest extent possible the impossible: unconditional justice, absolute
hospitality and the perfect gift.
Another text of Derrida which frequently leads to similar misconceptions,
namely that every person (also in the legal context) is an other, is The Gift of
Death2 where Derrida uses the phrase tout autre est tout autre (every other
(one) is every (bit) other).53 This text is also sometimes relied on to argue that
every case entails a sacrifice of the interests of the party that loses.' We do not
47 Derrida, Possibility ofJustice, supra note 19, at 22.
48 Ibid. at 27. See also at 24-25.
49 See Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1993) 33-34 [Derrida, Aporias]; Jacques Derrida & Elisabeth Roudinesco, For What
Tomorrow...A Dialogue, trans. by Jeff Fort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) 51-53
[Derrida & Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow].
50 It would of course not be "wrong" to speak of "the other" in translating Derrida into law,
provided this terminology is used to refer to the unforeseeable, the event, or the incalculable;
see Derrida & Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, supra note 49, at 49.
51 See in this regard Derrida's discussion of many of these issues in ibid. at 179.
52 Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death, trans. by David Wills (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1995) [Derrida, Gift ofDeath].
53 Ibid. at 68-71; see e.g., Desmond Manderson, 'Proximity and the Ethics of Law" (2005) 28(3)
U.N.S.W.L.J. 697 at 703-704.
54 Derrida, Gift of Death, supra note 52 at 85-86; see Johan van der Walt, Law and Sacrifice:
Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law (London and Johannesburg: Birkbeck Law Press
and Wits University Press, 2005) 11-14, 20. On my reading, the extensive publications of Van
der Walt on deconstruction and law dosely resemble that of the earlier work of Cornell (of the
late 1980s to the early 1990s). The notions of plurality, reconciliation and sacrifice that he
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have space here for a lengthy analysis of The Gift of Death. It would be
sufficient to note that, read in context, what Derrida is saying here is that
nothing justifies the drawing of a distinction between and giving to those that
are near and dear to us, rather than others (those we do not know or who are
far away)."5 What he says can hardly be translated into an argument that in
every court case the person who loses (irrespective of the interests or political
views of that person) is an other whose loss should be mourned, or that
because of this "undecidability", posed by the presence of many others, we are
fated to revert to legal principles.
IV. THE REMAINS
Cornell closely ties the notion of "the other" to the notion of the "remains"
in PoL. Following Charles Peirce's criticism of Hegel and linking this to
Levinas's encounter with the other as other, Cornell puts forward the notion
of "secondness" and links this in turn to deconstruction. She explains the
notion of secondness as follows:
The second aspect of deconstruction more accurately described
by the notion of the limit is related to what Charles Peirce in
his own critique of Hegelian idealism called secondness. By
secondness Peirce indicates the materiality that persists beyond
any attempt to conceptualize it. Secondness, in other words, is
what resists. Very simply, reality is not interpretation all the
way down. As we will see, Derrida continually points to the
failure of idealism to capture the real.'
In Transformations57 Cornell describes secondness as "the real that resists"
and as "that against which we struggle and which demands our attention to
what is outside ourselves and our representational schema." Secondness is also
equated with the "irreducible exteriority of what Adorno called the 'suffering
physical.' s Cornell 9 points out that Peirce does not deny the mediation of
all human knowledge of reality. Nevertheless, secondness is what remains; that
which cannot be fully captured by any system of signs. Cornell6' furthermore
tells us that "[s]econdness reminds us that there is an irreducible otherness that
remains 'beyond' to all systems of conscious meaning." Cornell, in other
words, expresses the view that there is a reality outside of language61 which
cannot be captured by language. Through a reading of Levinas this "reality" is
develops in his publications since the late 1990s find their correlates in Cornell's notions of
secondness, synchronization and the remains.
55 See also Jacques Derrida et al, "On Forgiveness: A Roundtable Discussion with Jacques
Derrida" in John D. Caputo, Mark Dooley and Michael J. Scanlon eds., Questioning God
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001) 52 at 68-69 [Derrida et al,
Questioning God].
56 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 1.
57 Cornell, Transformations, supra note 31 at 26.
58 Ibid. at 26.
59 Ibid. at 26.
60 Ibid. at 26.
61 See also ibid. at 25.
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equated with the other who is not represented in language. The other is the
real that resists, the remains:
Adorno shares with Derrida a critique of Hegelian totalisation in
the name of the remain(s), the otherness of "things" that can
never be adequately captured by any imposed definitions.
Such an exposure refuses the idea that what "reality" is can ever
be reduced to our conception of it... .The "conversation of
mankind," for Derrida, does not do away with the Other to us as
"material" reality. In this sense, Derrida is closer to Charles
Peirce in his understanding that there "is" a reality labeled by
Peirce as secondness. In his beautiful essay on the death of his
friend Paul de Man, he spoke of the secondness of death itself.
"It" is not interpretation all the way down for Derrida. Paul de
Man is dead, and that death and one's powerlessness before it has
all the force of hitting against a barrier that Peirce called
secondness. Derrida's philosophy of the limit exposes the limit of
the move to objective "spirit," particularly in the form of "the
conversation of mankind," as the answer to all our questions.62
The notion of secondness is ambiguous enough to make us think that there
is a correlation to Derrida's thinking. However, the differences could not be
greater. Although Derrida does speak of that which resists, the remains, I still
need to find the text where Derrida says that there is a reality outside of
language which resists interpretation. Does Derrida's famous "there is nothing
outside of the text" ' not say it all? For the sake of clarity we should perhaps
refer to Derrida's explanation of this enigmatic saying:
What I call "text" implies all the structures called "real,"
.economic," historical," socio-institutional, in short: all possible
referents. Another way of recalling once again that "there is
nothing outside the text." That does not mean that all referents
are suspended, denied, or enclosed in a book, as people have
claimed, or have been naive enough to believe and to have
accused me of believing. But it does mean that every referent,
all reality has the structure of a differential trace, and that one
cannot refer to this "real" except in an interpretive experience.'
Derrida does in the above passage speak of the "real," but he does so in a
special sense. The "remains", of which Derrida speaks in G/as6" and which
Cornell relates to "the other" that cannot be encapsulated within the system,'
62 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 178.
63 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and
London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974) at 158.
64 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc, trans. by Samuel Weber (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern
University Press, 1988) 148.
65 Jacques Derrida, G/as, trans. by John P. Leavy, Jr. and Richard Rand (Lincoln and London:
University of Nebraska Press, 1986).
66 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 63 and further.
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"is" something completely different from secondness or materiality. Because of
her vacillation between Derrida and Levinas, it is not always clear whether
this "other" that Cornell refers to is a concrete other (person) or that which is
in excess to representational systems. Cornell at one point in PoL does explain
that she understands the notion of "the other" in two different ways:
Ethical alternity [sic]67 is not just the command of the Other, it
is also the Other within the nomos that invites us to new
worlds and reminds us that transformation is not only possible,
it is inevitable.'
As we saw earlier, Cornell follows Levinas in saying that the concrete other
person gives access to the infinite Other.69 Both "others" can therefore on a
certain reading of Cornell be identified with the "remains'. z Cornell's reading
of Derrida (and Adorno) as "materialists"" as well as the way in which "the
other" is generally used in PoL, however, indicate that "the remains" in
Cornell are primarily those who are "other" to the system.' This is a
problematic understanding of the concept of the "remains". The "remains"
that Derrida speaks of cannot be identified with a physical person as Cornell
supposes. Instead "the remains" refers to that which escapes representation, as,
for example, justice or absolute hospitality, the pure gift or absolute
forgiveness; that which is never present as such, but of which a trace remains
in the same. In an interview Derrida has explained the notions of trace and the
remains as follows:
A trace is never present, fully present, by definition; it inscribes
in itself the reference to the spectre of something else. The
67 Cornell does sometimes correctly refer to Levinas's philosophy of alterity.
68 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 111.
69 This comes out very dearly in an earlier article by Drucilla Cornell, "Post-Structuralism, the
Ethical Relation, and the Law" (1988) 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1587, specifically at 1624-1625
[Cornell, "Post-Structuralism"].
70 See also Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 69 and Cornell, 'Beyond Accommodation" supra note 14
at 143-144.
71 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 56, 72, 178. The references to "materiality" in Paul de Mann's
texts that Derrida discusses in Jacques Derrida, Memoiresfor Paul de Man, Revised ed, trans. by
Cecile Lindsay et al (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 1989) 52-53 are linked by
Derrida to (1) that which is without presence and without substance, (2) thinking (as opposed
to knowing) and (3) "true 'mourning.'" As one can see, especially in Derrida's later texts, these
'themes' are linked to unconditional justice, absolute hospitality and the pure gift. At 53,
Derrida also links "matter of this sort" to "memory" (as opposed to interiorizing recollection)
and memory in turn is associated with "rupture, heterogeneity, disjunction" (at 56) and the "to
come" (at 58) [Derrida, Memoirs].
72 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 63, 66, 97. Cornell's reading of Adorno (specifically at 21 and 23-
24, 25-26, 35) also appears to assist her in her understanding of Derrida. The ethical relation
sometimes is characterized by a return to nature (see especially at 34). That Cornell
understands the remains in this way is also the reading of Christina Crosby, "Language and
Materialism" (1994) 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1657 at 1658 and 1659; and Thurschwell, supra note 36
at 1630 and 1638. Thurschwell at 1638 refers specifically to PoL at 149 where Cornell says that
the tradition or system "is called to remember its own exclusions and prejudices." On my
reading, Cornell also adopts this approach in Drucilla Cornell, "Rethinking the Beyond of the
Real" (1995) 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 729, specifically at 730-731 and 791-792.
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remainder is not present either, any more than a trace as such.
And that is why I have been much taken up with the question
of the remainder, often under this very name or more
rigorously under that of restance or remaining. The remaining
of the remainder is not reducible to an actual residue, or to
what is left after a subtraction, either. The remainder is not, it
is not a being, not a modification of that which is. Like the
trace, the remaining offers itself for thought before or beyond
being. It is inaccessible to a straightforward intuitive perception
(since it refers to something wholly other, it inscribes within
itself something of the infinitely other), and it escapes all forms
of prehension, all forms of monumentalization, and all forms
of archivation. Often, like the trace, I associate it with ashes:
remains without a substantial remainder, essentially, but which
have to be taken account of and without which there would be
neither accounting nor calculation, nor a principle of reason
able to give an account or a rationale (reddere rationem), nor a
being as such."3
The above passage again shows that Cornell misinterprets Derrida. One
could have let it pass were it not for the serious political consequences of such
misinterpretation. If "the remains" refer simply to every person who loses a
court case (as we saw above), deconstruction would have no (or at least very
conservative) political consequences. Those who resist the "transformation" of
society through court action would then be "others" who are owed an infinite
responsibility and who, when they 'lose", would have to be "mourned". If this
is the case, it would have been better if deconstruction had never "happened."'5
If the remains, instead, refers to that which escapes knowledge, to
unconditional hospitality, to the perfect gift, and to unconditional forgiveness,
the political consequences of any deconstruction could be immense for all
those who are traditionally excluded or marginalised through the structure of
thinking referred to by Derrida as carno-phallogocentric 6
V. MOURNING
A similar problem arises in Cornell's discussion of Derrida's reflections on
mourning.' Cornell's exposition of Derrida's analysis of mourning is accurate
73 Derrida, Paper Machine, supra note 39, at 151-152.
74 See para. If.
75 Derrida often says that deconstruction is not something that one does; it is something that
"happens" or which is constantly at work; see Derrida et a, "Hospitality", supra note 7 at 65;
Derrida, Memoirs, supra note 71 at 73; Jacques Derrida & Maurizio Ferraris, A Taste for the
Secret, trans. by Giacomo Donis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001) 64-65, 80 [Derrida & Ferraris,
Taste for the Secret].
76 See Jacques Derrida, Points..Interviews, 1974-1994, Elisabeth Weber ed., trans. by Peggy Kamuf
et al (Stanford, California Stanford University Press, 1995) 280 [Derrida, Points]. In interviews
with Derrida the political implications of his thinking appear very dearly; see in this respect eg
Derrida & Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, supra note 49; and Derrida, Paper Machine, supra
note 39.
77 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 72-81.
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with one exception: her analysis is influenced by the notion of secondness"
which was discussed above. This has an impact on the way in which she
translates the notion of "mourning" into law. Cornell's "act of remembrance"
remains a calculation' and steers clear of the incalculability of justice." In
what follows, Derrida's analysis of mourning will first be enquired into, after
which an attempt will be made to "translate" this analysis into law.
Derrida, reading Freud, shows that mourning has a paradoxical structure."
Mourning is "the attempt, always doomed to fail (thus a constative failure,
precisely), to incorporate, interiorize, introject, subjectivize the other in me.""
Mourning is doomed to failure, and thus to impossibility, because the other is
greater than us83 and therefore "resists the closure of our interiorizing
memory."' The other appears to us as other in her death or in the anticipated
possibility of her death and in this way makes clear to us our own limits,
having to harbour something within us that is greater than ourselves.85 A
"successful" work of mourning traditionally requires that the other be
completely incorporated within the self.86 Such a work of mourning, however,
would mean that we are no longer true to the memory of the other - the other
78 Ibid. at 1 and 72: "[D]eath...shatters the subject's illusion that he is the meaning-giving center
and puts him in touch with 'the materiality of actual history.' We confront the materiality of
actual history not so much through the confrontation with our own death which always
remains beyond us, but instead through the death of Other [sic]. The starkness of losing one
you love to death throws us against 'irreducible exteriority.'" Compare in this respect Derrida,
Memoirs, supra note 71 at 28-29: "The selbst, the soi-mme, the self appears to itself only in this
bereaved allegory, in this hallucinatory prosopopeia - and even before the death of the other
actually happens, as we say, in 'reality.'"
79 The "act of remembrance" that Cornell argues for is undoubtedly a necessary and often much
neglected aspect of legal decision-making.
80 In my view Cornell's statement (Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 151) about the anxiety that the
"deconstructibility of law" promotes is misplaced: "As women, our rights can always be
undermined." The impossible justice that Derrida speaks of in my view holds little threat for
women, at least not in this context. The undermining of women's right to abortion is more
likely to occur through a disregard of the justice that Derrida equates with deconstruction
justice in this "sense" can be equated with incalculable equality and equal freedom - see
Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 48-49).
81 See Derrida, Memoirs, supra note 71 at 6. This paradoxical structure, on my reading, is
excellently portrayed in J.M. Coetzee, The Master of Petersbusg (London: Vintage, 1994) where
Dostoevsky returns to Petersburg (in secret because of his many creditors) and mourns the
death of his stepson, Pavel Isaev. In Cornell, Between Women, supra note 10 at 195-197 fn 7 the
paradoxical structure of Derrida's reflections on mourning are referred to with approval by
Cornell. It is not completely clear from this footnote and the text accompanying it (xix-xx)
whether Cornell has changed her views regarding secondness. I am not convinced that she has.
See also Drucilla Cornell, Defending Ideals: War, Democracy, and Political Struggles (New York
and London: Routledge, 2004) 111-114.
82 Derrida, Points, supra note 76 at 321.
83 Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas, "Editors' Introduction" in Jacques Derrida, Tbe Work of
Mourning (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2001) 1 at 10 [Brault &
Naas, Work of Mourning].
84 Derrida, Memoirs, supra note 71 at 34.
85 Ibid. at 34 and 37-38.
86 Ibid. at 34: "Memory and interiorization: since Freud, this is how the "normal" "work of
mourning" is often described. It entails a movement in which an interiorizing idealization
takes in itself or upon itself the body and voice of the other, the other's visage and person,
ideally and quasi-literally devouring them."
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would be completely incorporated within the self, which would mean that the
other is no longer remembered as other. The other would be betrayed. In
mourning the other, there is always the danger and almost inevitability of
narcissism. 7 Mourning is taking pity upon oneself."8 Respecting the alterity of
the other, not taking, or being unable to take the other in myself (what
Derrida refers to as the impossible mourning), 9 would mean, of course, that
the mourning is unsuccessful. Therefore I must and I must not take the other
into myself.'C Derrida's reflections on mourning show us that this structure (of
mourning) is constitutive of the subject. The self (and friendship) is always
from the beginning affected by this structure, because the one (friend) will die
before the other. We are thus always already in mourning:
This carrying of the mortal other "in me outside me" instructs
or institutes my "self" and my relation to "myself" already
before the death of the other....Even before the death of the
other, the inscription in me of her or his mortality constitutes
me. I mourn, therefore I am, I am - dead with the death of the
other, my relation to myself is first of all plunged into
mourning, a mourning that is moreover impossible.9
Translated into law, we are being placed under an obligation to approach
the legal tradition in mourning. The law only lives "in us" and "for us." At the
same time, the law contains something greater than this (our representations
of it): unconditional justice. Justice always resists and can never be fully
represented in law.92 We should remind ourselves here again of Derrida's
reflections on the mystical foundations of authority.93 Every legal decision
repeats the founding violence of law (where the question of justice was posed
and deferred) through a conserving violence where the question of justice is
again posed and deferred." A legal decision is therefore in a sense a mourning
of the singular event of the founding violence of a legal system. A case that
comes to court can also be compared with the death of a friend (each time
unique) which interrupts the self; which shows that the self, the law, is never
at one with itself. Brault and Naas express this experience of the death of a
friend as follows:
87 Brault & Naas, Work of Mourning, supra note 83 at 6-7.
88 Ibid. at 7.
89 Derrida, Memoirs, supra note 71 at 6.
90 Derrida, Points, supra note 76 at 321.
91 Ibid. at 321.
92 Brault & Naas, Work of Mourning, supra note 83 at 11 say something similar regarding
mourning: "In mourning, we must recognize that the friend is now both only "in us" and
already beyond us, in us but totally other, so that nothing we say of or to them can touch
them in their infinite alterity."
93 Derrida, Possibility ofJustice, supra note 19.
94 Ibid. at 13-14, 23. The distinctions between "founding" and "conserving" violence are of course
those of Walter Benjamin, "Critique of Violence" in Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings,
eds., Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, vol 1:1913-1926 (Cambridge: The Bellknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1996) at 236-252.
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In mourning we find ourselves at a loss, no longer ourselves, as
if the singular shock of what we must bear had altered the very
medium in which it was to be registered. But even if the death
of a friend appears unthinkable, unspeakable, we are
nonetheless, says Derrida, called upon to speak, to break the
silence, to participate in the codes and rites of mourning.
"Speaking is impossible," writes Derrida in the wake of Paul de
Man's death, "but so too would be silence or absence or a
refusal to share one's sadness." 95
Cornell thinks that when Derrida speaks of our responsibility towards
heritage and that this heritage contains a "sheaf of injunctions," he requires of
us "to remember its own exclusions and prejudices."' Cornell of course has
good reason to say, applying this to abortion, that in the event that a fresh
decision needs to be taken on this issue or when evaluating past decisions, we
must remember "the history in which women did not have the right to an
abortion.""7 Cornell's discussion of abortion clearly shows the injustice of
which law is capable. And the law, even when it allows for abortion, will
perhaps never be able to allow for justice in this respect for all women. Not
because of the restrictions that need to be imposed as a result of the
progressive development of the unborn, but because of the restrictions on
access to safe abortion facilities by those who are poor within a country that
provides abortion facilities, as well as by those from other countries and in
other countries. The work of mourning is thus, indeed, a question of
knowledge," as Cornell correctly points out. It is about knowledge of the law
in the past, of its consequences" as well as a calculated projection of the
consequences of changes to the law."se But it is also more than that.' And this
.more" is already inscribed within the legal tradition as a promise."n The
"sheaf of injunctions" that Cornell refers to is actually a reference to the
excessive injunctions that are inscribed in the heritage, such as the pure gift,
unconditional justice and unconditional hospitality, as compared to the more
restrictive and conditional forms thereof."3 A textual analysis, in other words,
is required which has the potential for "radical transformation."" 4 Looking
at the real exclusions of the system is important, but that still amounts
to calculation.
95 Brault & Naas, Work of Mourning, supra note 83 at 5.
96 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 149.
97 Ibid. at 149. For a few remarks by Derrida on abortion, which show his stance, see Derrida &
Roudinesco, For What Tomorrow, supra note 49 at 139-140.
98 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New
International, trans. by Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 1994) at 9 [Derrida,
Spectres of Marx].
99 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 149, 152, 153.
100 Ibid. at 152
101 Memory, as we see in Derrida, Memoirs, supra note 71 at 56 and 58, is to be distinguished from
interiorizing recollection (which is what "memory" is for Cornell).
102 See Rodolphe Gasch6, "Europe, or the Inheritance of Responsibility" (2005) 27 Cardozo L.
Rev. 587.
103 See Derrida et al, Questioning God, supra note 55 at 58-59.
104 This phrase is Cornell's; see Cornell, Transformations, supra note 31 at 35.
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Mourning and doing justice' are thus not simply about calculation, but
about infinite responsibility, not only to those who are near us (and who can
make it to the abortion clinic or the court room in time), but also to those
who are far, because, what could ultimately justify our choice between these
women?"°' The position is similar insofar as gay rights are concerned.' Not
prosecuting those classified as "gay" for how they express their sexuality is
only one step in an infinite number of steps that need to be taken to ensure
the equal treatment of gays in all respects, everywhere.' The same applies to
those who are discriminated against on the basis of their race,"°' as well as on
other grounds. An incalculable equality is what justice demands of us."'
But remembrance, the conjuring of the legal tradition and its effects, also
gives rise to anxiety. To respond to the tradition, to be responsible for the
tradition, entails the absence of "any certainty or symmetry; ""' it "upsets all
calculations, interests, and capital.""' Mourning the suffering of those who
died because of the law (mourning justice), which in a sense happens when one
decides a case or reflects on the law in a certain way, might appear to be
hospitable, but it always gives rise to "a movement of repulsion or
restriction.""' As in mourning, the law almost inevitably will attempt to
cushion the trauma of the singular event, as well as "assimilate it, interiorize it
and incorporate it.""4 Nevertheless, recognizing the promise of unconditional
justice, the spectrality within law, is clearly different from and is bound to
have different consequences, compared to viewing law as purely identical
to itself or with an assured inside,"5 as we find in most theoretical accounts
of law.
VI. THE SAME AND THE BEYOND
Cornell is aware of Derrida's criticism of Levinas, specifically that "there
can be no rupture with metaphysics except from within the tradition.""" Yet
she does not believe that the tradition contains within itself anything of the
infinite (or, at least, she sometimes denies it):
105 See Derrida, Spectres of Marx, supra note 98, at 98 for the link drawn between the two.
106 Derrida, Gift of Death, supra note 52 at 68-71. The slogan from the 1970s which Cornell, PoL,
supra note 1 at 153 refers to is also interestingly enough without limitation: "women want
abortion now."
107 See the discussion of Bowers v Hardwick (1986) 478 U.S. 186 in Cornell, PoL, supra note 1
at 159-167.
108 Women and gays are the two "marginalized" groups that Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 11
specifically argues for.
109 See Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 139-140 on Brown v Board of Education (1954) 347 U.S. 483.
110 Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 48-49.
111 Derrida, Specters ofMarx, supra note 98 at 109.
112 Ibid. at 136.
113 Ibid. at 108 on conjuring spectres.
114 Ibid. at 98.
115 Ibid. at 99, 109.
116 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 69.
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We cannot escape representational schemes. Yet, at the same
time, we must recognize their inevitable infidelity to radical
otherness. The Saying cancels itself as soon as it is said." 7
As we saw above, Cornell tends to draw a strict distinction between law and
justice."' This is a consequence of the prior distinction that Cornell draws
between the encounter of the other and the entry of the third."9 We also saw
earlier that Cornell seems to follow Levinas in saying that the encounter with
the other exposes us to infinity (or "the Good" in her terms). In Violence and
Metaphysics2' Derrida contends that access to the infinite is not obtained
through an encounter with the other as Levinas claims. It is something that
only language allows and at the same time disallows. Derrida is of the view
that the infinite arrives at the same instance in which the same is posited. The
infinite can therefore only be accessed (and not accessed) through the same:
What authorizes him [Levinas] to say "infinitely other" if the
infinitely other does not appear as such in the zone he calls the
sam~e... ?
12 1
[T]he same is not a totality dosed in upon itself, an identity
playing with itself, having only the appearance of alterity, in
what Levinas calls economy, work, and history."2
The infinite, excess, "is" in other words already in the same, in law, inscribed
in law."2 A literal encounter with an other in court is not required for this
excess to show itself. Every linguistic expression, including that of Cornell in
PoL, is a response to the other. 124 In the words of Derrida:
Each time I open my mouth, I am promising something. When
I speak to you, I am telling you that I promise to tell you
something, to tell you the truth. Even if I lie, the condition of
my lie is that I promise to tell you the truth. So the promise is
117 Ibid. at 70.
118 Ibid. at 157, 166 (also in Cornell, "Rethinking Legal Ideals after Deconstruction" supra note 10 at
150 and 162). The relation between law and justice is explained well, in my view, by Christoph
Menke, Ability and Faitb: On the Possibility oflustice (2005) 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 595.
119 See Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 105.
120 Supra note 40.
121 Ibid. at 156.
122 Ibid. at 158.
123 Gaschk, Mirror, supra note 15 at 104-105 puts it as follows: "The impure and unconditional
heterology focuses on an alterity that does not lend itself to phenomenologization, that escapes
presentation of itself in propria persona. This 'radical' alterity thus marks a 'space' of
exteriority at the border of philosophy, whether or not philosophy is explicitly
phenomenological. It is situated on the margin of what can be meaningfully totalized."
124 See Jacques Derrida "Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism" in Chantal Mouffe, ed.,
Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 77 at 82-83
[Derrida, Deconstruction].
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not just one speech act among others; every speech act is
fundamentally a promise.'2
This of course does not mean that the promise (of justice) is fulfilled in every
speech act, but it does mean that law interrupts itself, a text interrupts itself,
deconstructs itself because it is not homogeneous. 126 Derrida would be unlikely
to agree with Cornell's statement referred to above that "[t]he Saying cancels
itself as soon as it is said." As we have already seen, this understanding of
Cornell has important consequences for her construction of the relationship
between law and justice. There are nevertheless moments in PoL when Cornell
recognizes the self-transcendence of the same. This is, however, portrayed in a
more moderate form in her model for decision-making, than Derrida's
understanding of such excess. When she discusses the differences between
Derrida and Levinas, Cornell correctly points out that
Derrida emphasizes the 'self-transcendence' of the Same. The
iteration of the same 'is' as transformation. Even if Levinas is
read to displace the rigid dichotomy of transcendence and
immanence - and I believe this is how he should be read - he
does not, like Derrida, focus our attention on the self-
transcendence of the Same.
127
Cornell also expresses her agreement with Derrida in this respect. Cornell
however does not appear to understand fully the significance of this. In
translating the self-transcendence of the same into law, Cornell bridles
Derrida's thought of the impossible. We saw this in her reference to the ethical
relation as "the Good."129 Cornell also speaks of "the dream of Justice.""' For
Cornell there has to be a "translation" of the "prior" ethical relationship into
law. Cornell believes that the ethical relation is something that we should
aspire to, even though it cannot be actualized."' This again shows her alliance
with (a certain reading of) Levinas rather than Derrida and her
misunderstanding of the non-concept of diffi&rance.
125 Jacques Derrida et al, "The Villanova Roundtable: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida" in
John D. Caputo ed., Deconstruction in a NutshelL- A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1997) 22-23 [Derrida et al, Roundtable].
126 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael Naas
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999) 118 [Derrida, Adieu]. See also Derrida et
al, Questioning God, supra note 55 at 58-59.
127 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 109. See also at 84.
128 Ibid. at 110-111.
129 See para. II supra. On Derrida's reading of the idea of the Good in Plato and its relation to the
unconditional, see Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 134-140.
130 Ibid. at 183. For Derrida, justice is a desire rather than a dream; see Jacques Derrida et al, "A
Discussion with Jacques Derrida" (2001) 5(1) Theory and Event para 33 available at
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory & event/toc/tae5.lhtml> (date accessed: 21 June
2006). Justice, the impossible, is also that which we can think, rather than knou, see Jacques
Derrida et al, "Die Tragiese, die Onmoontlike en die Demokrasie: 'n Onderhoud met Jacques
Derrida" (1999) 3 Fragmente 35 at 39-40.
131 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 84.
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VII. THE IDEAL OF COMMUNITY
As we saw in the summary of PoL above,132 the notion of reciprocal
symmetry and consequently of an "ideal community" is one of the central
themes of the book. On Cornell's interpretation Derrida "hesitantly
recognizes the dream of communicative freedom, the ideal of community or
communalism understood as belonging together without violence.""' This
ideal community is one where there would be reconciliation without unity."4
Cornell relies on the following passage from Violence and Metaphysics in
support of this claim:
A community of the question, therefore, within that fragile
moment when the question is not yet determined enough for
the hypocrisy of an answer to have already initiated itself
beneath the mask of the question, and not yet determined
enough for its voice to have been already and fraudulently
articulated within the very syntax of the question. A
community of decision, of initiative, of absolute initiality, but
also a threatened community, in which the question has not yet
found the language it has decided to seek, is not yet sure of its
own possibility within the community. A community of the
question about the possibility of the question.1
5
Cornell then proceeds to ask whether, but in effect to claim, that the
.question about the possibility of the question" is "the dream of
communicative freedom, in which this dream of reconciliation is no longer
conceived as a unity."136 This is a very doubtful passage on which to base a
claim that Derrida supports the notion of an ideal community. Derrida has
often distanced himself from the idea of a community. For example in one
interview he said: "I don't much like the word community, I am not even sure
I like the thing."137 So how should we then understand the above passage?
Derrida's relation to the notion of community is a complex one. On the one
hand, he does not reject the idea that there "are" communities, for example a
legal community or different legal communities within a specific country
around questions of or approaches to interpretation. This need not be
something bad although it can be bad, as Cornell knows and describes so well:
when unity, totality and homogeneity are privileged, as happens in patriarchal
and homophobic communities." '3 At the same time a "community" is
instituted on the basis of a promise, a perhaps; in the case of a legal
community, the promise or perhaps of justice which forbids that community
132 See para. 1I.
133 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 60. See also at 40.
134 Ibid. at 57.
135 Ibid. at 57 quoting from Derrida, Violence and Metaphysics at 80 (page 98 in the edition I
consulted, supra note 40).
136 Ibid.
137 Derrida, Points, supra note 76 at 355; Jacques Derrida, Politics of Friendship, trans. by George
Collins (London and New York: Verso, 1997) 304-305 [Derrida, Friendship]; and Derrida &
Ferraris, Taste for the Secret, supra note 75 at 24-25.
138 Derrida et a, Roundtable, supra note 125 at 13.
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from collecting or gathering or closing itself,'39 but instead opens it up at the
moment of its formation.4 ' To refer to this opening, this "impossible
perhaps", as an ideal community, is problematic because of the very notion of
"community" itself. Caputo' in his inimitable style expresses the problem
with this notion as follows:
What he [Derrida] does not like about the word community is
its connotations of "fusion" and "identification".... After all,
communio is a word for a military formation and a kissing
cousin of the "munitions"; to have a communio is to be fortified
on all sides, to build a "common" (corn) "defense" (munis), as
when a wall is put up around the city to keep the stranger or
the foreigner out.
The passage from Violence and Metaphysics quoted earlier must be understood
in light of these reflections of Derrida. Derrida is speaking in that passage of
the philosophical community, the community of the question. What enables
this community, what makes it possible, is "the question of the question."
This question is not about the dream of an ideal community, as Cornell
supposes, but the originary question, the pure question, the question as such. 42
The question relates to philosophical language, a philosophical language which
is traditionally dominated but not completely controlled by questions of
identity, conceptuality and the law of non-contradiction.'43 This traditional
language, questions in the language of the same and is thus inhospitable to the
other. The possibility of the question of the question places the host, the
subject, the I, in question (the host as hostage) and thus has a concern for "the
possibility of philosophical language to receive or welcome what precedes or
exceeds it."'" This is the question (the questioning of the question) that is
implicitly raised by Levinas in Totality and Infinity.'45 The question of the
possibility of the question thus relates to the question of unconditional
hospitality to the other (before all questions).' 46 In the words of Derrida:
Does hospitality consist in interrogating the new arrival? Does
it begin with the question addressed to the newcomer...: what is
your name?...Or else does hospitality begin with the
139 Derrida, Points, supra note 76 at 355.
140 Derrida, Friendship, supra note 137 at 38 on democracy.
141 John D. Caputo, "Community without Community" in Derrida et al, Roundtable, supra note
125 at 108-109.
142 Michael Naas, Taking on the Tradition: Jacques Derrida and the Legacies of Deconstruction
(Stanford. Stanford University Press, 2003) 97 [Naas, Tradition].
143 Ibid. at 102.
144 Ibid. at 94.
145 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by Alphonso Lingis
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).
146 Naas, Tradition, supra note 142 at 102-103, 112-113. See also Derrida in Dufourmantelle &
Derrida, Of Hospitality, supra note 35 at 29: "The question of hospitality is thus also the
question of the question."
2007
HeinOnline  -- 25 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 52 2007
Deconstruction, Derida, Levinas & Cornell
unquestioning welcome, in a double effacement of the question
and the name?147
The question of unconditional hospitality, as we know, is tied intimately with
the perhaps, the promise of what is to come and of what remains to come. The
question nevertheless emerges with the third - who is there from the
beginning-1" which implies the inevitability of a negotiation between the
unconditional and the conditioned.149
Another passage of Derrida on which Cornell relies in relation to her
notion of an ideal community and, more specifically of reconciliation, has to
be scrutinized. Cornell refers to a passage in Derrida's Des Tours de Babel"' to
suggest that "Derrida's ambivalence toward giving voice to 'redemptive'
perspectives does not just express the reluctance to 'represent' divine
aspiration."' 1 According to Cornell this "reluctance" -
is not found in all of his texts. In his essay on Walter
Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator," Derrida appeals to
the promise of reconciliation in a messianic tongue as the
promise of translations. Yet Derrida insists it is a promise of
reconciliation and not an achieved reality. But he reminds us,
"[a] promise is not nothing," and indeed he suggests that
without this promise the task of the translator would be
impossible. Derrida is surprisingly sympathetic to Benjamin's
assertion that translation is a "redemptive" task, because it
inevitably appeals to the promise of reconciliation in a
messianic tongue."
Cornell knows that the passage she refers to deals with the reconciliation of
languages in the context of translation. The promise that is at issue in this
passage is a promise of reconciliation, of the translation touching the
untouchable of the translated text, the untouchable that resists the translation,
the remains of language."5 3 Translation, Derrida points out, has a paradoxical
structure which makes it both necessary and impossible."M It is interesting to
note that this is the only passage of Derrida that Cornell relies on in this
chapter to make the claim referred to above: that Derrida also dreams "of
communicative freedom, in which this dream of reconciliation is no longer
conceived as a unity." ' In the discussion that follows the above-quoted
147 Dufourmantelle & Derrida, Of Hospitality, supra note 35 at 27-29.
148 Derrida, Adieu, supra note 126 at 32, 56.
149 Naas, Tradition, supra note 142 at 103-106.
150 See Jacques Derrida, "Des Tours de Babel" trans. by Joseph F. Graham in Difference in
Translation (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1985) 165 [Derrida, Translation]; see
also the reprint of this text in Derrida, Acts ofReligion, supra note 35 at 104-133.
151 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 59.
152 Ibid.
153 Derrida, Translation, supra note 150 at 191-192.
154 In a later text, Derrida would relate this impossible moment of pure translation to forgiveness
or mercy; see Jacques Derrida, "What is a "Relevant" Translation?" (Winter 2001) 27 Critical
Inquiry 174.
155 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 57.
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passage, it is, furthermore, clear that she relies on Des Tours de Babel to make
this claim about Derrida, reconciliation and "communicative freedom."
Leaving aside the issue of the permissibility of this "translation" by Cornell of
the notion of reconciliation from one context to another, it would not be
untrue to say that Derrida is in favour of reconciliation between those in a
community or between different communities, countries or religions. His
relationship with the concept of reconciliation (in this sense) is nevertheless a
complex one. Whereas politically he favours reconciliation, he believes that a
reconciliation worthy of the name cannot be equated with a "compromise," a
"deal" or a strategic calculation.'56 A reconciliation worthy of the name would
be one that is just.' This, in a sense, would mean that one would have to
suspend the hope of redemption, of reconciliation and also of "re-constituting
a healthy and peaceful community."'' Derrida can in other words be said not
to be against the hope of redemption, reconciliation and an ideal community,
but at the same time he would say that "when one is not ready to suspend
the determination of hope then our relation with the other becomes
again economical." 15 9
The notion of utopianism is closely associated with the ideal of community
in Cornell's thinking."6 According to Cornell, Derrida's thinking is to be
distinguished from liberalism due to the "Utopian moment" in his thinking
"that cannot be erased." 6' I agree with the distinction between Derrida and
liberalism, but I disagree with Cornell's criterion for the distinction. The "to
come," "the impossible" and the "messianic" in Derrida's texts, on my reading,
should not be equated with utopia. Derrida has often distanced himself from
the notion of utopia with its connotations of the distant future instead of the
here and now.'62 This does not mean that Derrida completely rejects the
notion of utopia, seeing that it has "critical powers that we should probably
never give up on, especially when we make it a reason for resisting all alibis
and all 'realistic' or 'pragmatic' cop-outs."'63 Cornell's utopia cannot of course
be accused of a lack of urgency - she does stress the importance of urgency in
PoL.'" Cornell's ideal community is furthermore something which needs to be
taken account of and aspired to in every judicial decision, according to her
model. Nevertheless, as the word "aspiration" makes dear, Cornell's model
for decision-making remains within the order of the "I can," of "ipseity," of
156 Jacques Derrida & Richard Kearney, "A Dialogue with Jacques Derrida" (Spring 2004)
Philosophy Today 4 [Derrida & Kearney, "Dialogue"]; Derrida et al, Questioning God, supra
note 55 at 56-57.
157 Ibid.
158 Derrida & Kearney, "Dialogue", supra note 156 at 5.
159 Ibid. at 4-5.
160 We find more references to utopianism in Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, supra note 14, and
its apparent link with deconstruction. Apart from the references in the word index, see pages
18-20, 35, 91, 107-108. See also Cornell, "Rethinking the Beyond" supra note 41, at 102-103
where Cornell again links Derrida with utopianism.
161 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 8 read with 186 fn 13; also 146, 156 and 182.
162 See e.g., Derrida, Deconstruction, supra note 124 at 82-83.
163 Derrida, Paper Machine, supra note 39 at 131.
164 See e.g., Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 134, 153.
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subjectivity and of knowledge.16 Distancing oneself from a "subject-centered
approach to the ethical""' is not sufficient to interrupt subjectivity in judicial
decision-making.
Part of the problem is that Cornell appears to misunderstand the
implications of diff&ance which she specifically links with utopianism.
67
Cornell asserts that she fully accepts the implications of diff&rance without
seemingly realizing what they are:
What I am suggesting is that the dissemination of convention,
through diff&ance as the nonfull, nonsimple, and differentiating,
origin of differences, disrupts the claims of ontology to fill the
universe, and more specifically, the legal universe.16
Instead of noticing the paradoxical structure of normative concepts that
diff&ance leads to, including its implications of a general economy of excess
with no return to the self, 69 Cornell only notices its disruption of the same,
with her utopia returning to herself. For her, diff&ance creates two distinct
orders. Cornell's ideal community undoubtedly retains something of the
opening within itself of Derrida's understanding of identity. Her ideal
community, her utopia, is a more open one than many "communities"
currently in existence, but it is by no means what one could call radically open.
What it promises remains foreseeable, remains sure of itself, of exactly what the
other is entitled to and of what is required of us as "an ideal community."
VIII. THE GOOD AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The task Cornell foresees in the light of Levinas's thought is explained
as follows:
In Levinas, although there is an inevitable diremption between
the Law of Law, the Good, and the actual, we can also not
escape our responsibility, particularly if we are law professors,
judges, and lawyers, to elaborate principles of justice which can
guide us in the effort to synchronize the competing claims of
individuals and to adjudicate between divergent interpretations
of doctrine."Z
This passage again shows the rigid distinction that Cornell tends to draw
between law and justice. The Good cannot be directly translated into law,
Cornell" says, because legal principles always violate difference. Legal
165 See Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 84-85 where he distinguishes the impossible from a
regulative idea.
166 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 102.
167 See Cornell, Beyond Accommodation, supra note 14 at 108.
168 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 110.
169 See Jacques Derrida "Diff&ance" in Margins of Philosophy trans. by Alan Bass (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1982) 1 at 19.
170 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 100.
171 Ibid. at 105.
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principles, she believes, can nevertheless play a role in minimizing violence. As
all claims cannot be vindicated, we thus need legal principles in order to guide
us through the maze of competing legal interpretations."' Legal principles are
needed, in Levinasian terms, because of the entry of the third. The primary
principle that Cornell invokes in this regard is that of reciprocal symmetry.73
The ability of a principle "to synchronize the competing universals embodied in
the nomos" will ultimately determine whether it (the principle) will find a place
in the legal system." 4 Reason plays an important part in this model: "An
essential aspect of thematization," Cornell says, "is the practical use of reason
to synchronize the competing demands and perspectives of individuals through
the appeal to legal principle.""" Although reason is linked to critical thinking,
to the command to be just and to "the exercise of ethical responsibility to the
Other,"'76 there is no indication that Cornell's concept of reason or her legal
principles leave room for an interruption of subjectivity."7 In spite of her
adoption of many Derridean themes, the legal principles which Cornell
believes should be established remain the products of an autonomous subject?78
The Good is beyond any of its current justifications. As a
result, when we appeal "back" to what has been established, we
must look forward to what "might be." As we do so, we
represent what "might be." Without a simple origin the very
process of discovery of legal principles from within the nomos
will also involve invention. It is this specific appeal to the
"ought to be" that demands a vision of the Good that goes
beyond the appeal to convention. The "origin" we evoke in our
thematizations is ultimately a representation of the future.
Legal interpretation demands that we remember the future."'
As can be seen, Cornell's principles are closely related to her notion of
"recollective imagination" in interpretation. This involves legal precedent, or
the past and the projection of future ideals through which the community
172 Ibid. Costas Douzinas & Ronnie Warrington, "A Well-Founded Fear of Justice: Law and Ethics in
Postmodernity" in Jerry D Leonard ed., Legal Studies as Cultural Studies: A Reader in (Post)Modern
Critical Theory (State University of New York Press, 1995) 197 at 219-220 criticize Cornell for her
invocation of legal principles. They argue that principles always entail universalism and therefore
do violence to the unique. In Cornell's defence, she does point out that legal principles also
inevitably violate difference by creating analogies between the like and the unlike (the same with
guiding factors). However, she believes that flexible principles or guidelines minimize such
violence (compared to formalistic principles); see Cornell, spra note 1 at 105-106.
173 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 106.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
176 Ibid. at 107.
177 See also above on subjectivity and the ideal community. On the need for a disruption of
subjectivity in order for a decision and an event which welcomes the other to stand a chance,
see Derrida, Friendship, supra note 137 at 68; and for discussion, see Geoffrey Bennington,
Interrupting Derrida (New York and London: Routledge, 2000) 27 and 43-44.
178 Some scholars have noted this feature in Cornell's later texts; see Maxine Eichner, 'On
Postmodern Feminist Legal Theory" (2001) 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 1 at fn 78.
179 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 110-111. See also at 118.
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seeks to regulate itself."' The principles internal to a legal system"' thus
contain an openness to the future or "would be's"."' We begin with the past
in taking decisions, but the process is also prospective because of the potential
inherent in the past."' There is a promise of synchronization in law." 4 The
recollection of legal principles is never mere exposition, but involves the
imagination and the positing of ideals.'
In invoking ideals, Cornell claims to be following not only Levinas, but also
Derrida. Cornell refers in this regard to Derrida saying that "there is nothing
less old-fashioned than the traditional emancipatory ideals."' 86 This is not
completely accurate. In the passage that Cornell refers us to, Derrida speaks of
"emancipatory battles" and "the classic emancipatory ideal.""' Cornell...
furthermore clearly misunderstands Derrida's reference to ideals. In Force of
Law,s Derrida makes the point that what he is saying about justice, as the
impossible should not be confused with the Kantian regulative idea."9 He
explains that this is because the notion of an idea implicates a horizon which
means that it is limited and also that it does not contain the sense of urgency
or of unconditionality. 9' Cornell however reads Derrida to say (after having
read Luhmann who says this) that "the ideal cannot guide us precisely because
it is the ideal and thus not present."' Her other explanation of why Derrida
distances himself from the notion of an ideal is correct: the ideal is simply a
rationalized projection of our current norms.'93 However, Cornell then does
not draw the seemingly logical conclusion that justice is something other than
an ideal for Derrida. She instead concludes that we must still work with these
ideals as ideals."M Justice, she says, simply "demands the recognition of the
possible contamination of the ideal itself."195 According to Cornell,' Derrida,
because he wants "to prevent the justification of one norm as justice.. .appeals
180 Cornell, Transformations, supra note 31 at 23.
181 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 118-119, 165.
182 Cornell, Transformations, supra note 31 at 27.
183 Ibid. at 27-28.
184 Ibid. at 35.
185 Ibid. at 39.
186 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 108.
187 Derrida, Possibility ofJustice, supra note 19 at 28.
188 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 134-135.
189 Derrida, Possibility ofJustice, supra note 19 at 25 and 26
190 As Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 48-49, and 133 also shows, he has a complex relation to the
ideals of equality, freedom and dignity.
191 See also ibid. at 84 and 142.
192 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 134.
193 Ibid. at 135.
194 In "Rethinking Legal Ideals after Deconstruction" supra note 10 Cornell presents her position
regarding ideals as a parting of ways with Derrida. On Derrida's response to a question as to
what should be done "after deconstruction," see Derrida et al, "Hospitality", supra note 7 at 65:
"Your question started with the phrase 'after deconstruction', and I must confess I do not
understand what is meant by such a phrase. Deconstruction is not a philosophy or a method, it
is not a phase, a period or a moment. It is something which is constantly at work and was at
work before what we call 'deconstruction' started, so I cannot periodize. For me there is no
'after' deconstruction - not that I think that deconstruction is immortal - but for what I
understand under the name deconstruction, there is no end, no beginning, and no after."
195 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 135 (emphasis added).
196 Ibid.
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to the overflowing of the performative." She refers in this regard to the ideal
of the "rational man" in legal thinking. This is not untrue, but the overflowing
of the performative does more than this. The overflowing of the performative
"is" justice, which as we saw above, "is" also in excess of ideals. Insofar as
reason, equality, freedom and dignity can be regarded as (emancipatory)
"ideals" that play a role in Derrida's thinking, their structure is not of an ideal
nature. All these concepts have a paradoxical structure in Derrida's thinking,
which invokes an aporia of the conditional and the unconditional."7
Cornell's legal principles thus are (following Levinas) based on a
"translation" from the "prior" ethical relation with the other which calls for a
"disruption" or innovation of the system, but not in such a way that
subjectivity or the value of "the good of the community"19 is put into
question. As we saw above, the infinite, the Saying, incalculable justice,
absolute hospitality, in Derrida's elaboration of these Levinasian concepts,"'
are thus given almost no space in Cornell's model. Cornell moves from
asymmetry (which Derrida also refers to as the impossible and the perfect gift)
directly to symmetry2°° without retaining the paradoxical structure of
normative concepts. Abandoning the paradoxical structure of normative
concepts has led to deconstruction being understood as merely responsiveness,
or as simply making transformation or alternative solutions possible."' To say
it again: Cornell's use of the concept of the "Good" as a synonym for justice
indicates that her model of decision-making holds little threat for the (no
doubt more open) community and its values."° The host does not risk
becoming a hostage. 3 Cornell thus chooses a "tamer" or more domesticated
reading of Levinas than does Derrida. °4 It is this reading, I believe, that allows
Cornell to move so easily from justice to the principle of reciprocal symmetry.
The other calls us to justice (understood at times as a respect for singularity),0"
197 See in this respect Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7.
198 Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 113.
199 The "concept" of absolute hospitality was admittedly developed in detail by Derrida only after
the publication of PoL.
200 Cornell, PoL, supra note I at 84-85.
201 See e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001) 73-79 (2001); and A.J. van der Walt, "Dancing with Codes - Protecting,
Developing and Deconstructing Property Rights in a Constitutional State" (2001) 118 South
African L.J. 258-311 at 302-303 (reading Jennifer Nedelsky, Johan van der Walt, Karin van
Marle and Joseph Singer). These readings amount to a reduction of deconstruction with the
subject remaining firmly in place.
202 This can also be seen in Cornell's description of the "ethical relation." Cornell, PoL, supra note
1 at 13 says that this relation "focuses on the kind of person one must become in order to
develop a nonviolative relationship to the Other," see also at 62.
203 Cornell's understanding of the notion of asymmetry with reference to Levinas is insightful in
this respect (Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 53): "The alterity of the Other is displayed in her
separateness or asymmetry in her stance toward me. She is the stranger; yet as the orphan, the
widow, and the hungry, she is also the one who judges me on the basis of my responsibility to
her. In Levinas, responsibility does not await reciprocity, and therefore the relationship to the
other is necessarily asymmetrical."
204 Compare in this respect Derrida, Adieu, supra note 126 at 55-64.
205 Cornell, "Post-Structuralism", supra note 69 at 1591-1592.
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but because of the third, competing demands need to be synchronized.2' The
question is whether Cornell's "taming" of the notion of infinite responsibility
in setting out the structure of decision-making does not translate into
irresponsibility. As Derrida says
Without silence, without the hiatus, which is not the absence of
rules, but the necessity of a leap at the moment of ethical,
political, or juridical decision, we could simply unfold knowledge
into a program or course of action. Nothing could make us more
irresponsible; nothing could be more totalitarian.2°z
Cornell's notion of "responsibility," in spite of her claims to the contrary,
remains a calculation.' In Cornell's model, although she prescribes the critical
questioning of a given legal system, there is no need for a leap, only a muted
infinite responsibility towards the other. By ultimately not questioning
subjectivity in decision-making and the good of the (albeit more open)
community, we remain locked within the spheres of politics and law.2"
Cornell's model, although insisting that no legal system can be regarded as
just2. and although it calls for the radical transformation of the existing
system, 211 still does not provide us with the necessary theoretical means of
bringing this about. Instead, it provides us with an ideal which remains within
the order of knowledge, and therefore of subjectivity and ipseity, and which
allows us to believe that under certain circumstances we have done enough
to bring about justice.2 1 It is a model which ultimately ensures a
good conscience.
Cornell's principles could be "saved" from irresponsibility, but then they
need to be linked more directly to justice. In the same way in which justice as
law and justice as absolute responsibility towards the event are both part of
the paradoxical structure of justice, Cornell's principles of law could be
understood as having a paradoxical structure. By understanding law like this
(as containing an excess within itself, as interrupting itself as other),"' it also
becomes less necessary to identify the other in a specific case, to be able to say
who the other is. As indicated above, the need to do justice is not dependent
upon some suffering or marginalized other standing before a court, although it
can and does happen (yet, by that time there is already an element of
206 See also ibid. at 1619-1620; and Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 89 where this is also motivated by
"the striving for happiness" or the "longing to be happy" as "[w]e do not have much fun in the
ethical relation."
207 Derrida, Adieu, supra note 126 at 117. See also Jacques Derrida, The Other Heading: Reflections
on Today's Europe, trans. by Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael B. Naas (Bloomington and
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992). 71-72
208 See Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 115, 147, 149, 150.
209 Ibid. at 156 where Cornell describes the function of deconstruction as giving us "the politics of
utopian possibility" (my emphasis).
210 Ibid. at 116, 118.
211 Ibid. at 144-147, 156.
212 See ibid. at 150.
213 Derrida, Adieu, supra note 126 at 51-55.
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familiarity and loss of strangeness). 24 The promise and appeal of language is
involved in each singular act of engagement, a promise that belongs to
language (and to law).21 1 In the context of judicial decision-making,
responsibility requires that even before a specific plaintiff or applicant seeks a
remedy, a welcome should be extended to what or who comes. This welcome,
this willingness to sacrifice the self, is thus not dependent on knowledge - that
is, on who the applicant is or what the case is about.
IX. CONCLUSION
To conclude, Cornell's project in PoL should be distinguished from
deconstruction.216 Cornell's model allows the subject to remain firmly in place,
perhaps a more open-minded subject, 217 but a subject nonetheless, 218 who
cannot be said to have been displaced, decentered or re-inscribed.219 As we saw,
a change in judicial decision-making is proposed with reference to principles
such as reciprocal symmetry. Like the subject, the law remains firmly in place,
not haunted much by an asymmetrical justice. Cornell's project ultimately
amounts to a political reduction of the "hyperethics" or "hyperpolitics"a0 of
deconstruction. It is perhaps necessary to point out that Derrida nowhere
encourages his readers to misread him or any other text, as some appear to
believe. Derrida reads the tradition with reference to the logic of diff&ance as
containing a trace of the impossible, the condition of possibility of the
tradition, of ethics, of politics, of law (the possible). There is clearly a major
difference between such a reading of texts and a misreading which simply
appropriates texts (including that of Derrida) so as to support the reader's own
restrictive ethical, political or legal views (the possible), irrespective of the
sophistication of such views."
My problem is not that Cornell proposes a programme for political action -
it is surely permissible for women, gays or anyone else to do so, also with
reference to Derrida's texts. Indeed, through deconstruction a space is left
open for such a more "hospitable" politics. My unease lies in the fact that -
although Cornell speaks of the philosophy of the limit rather than
214 Derrida, Aporias, supra note 49 at 33-34; and Naas, Tradition, supra note 142 at 159, 164 remind
us that once we know who the other/the arrivant is, s/he is no longer other.
215 Derrida, Deconstruction, supra note 124 at 82-83.
216 I do not wish to imply hereby that deconstruction has a single form; see in this regard Derrida,
Memoirs, supra note 71 at 17.
217 In Cornell, PoL, supra note 1 at 59 Cornell speaks of "the dislocation of the centered, sovereign
subject," but this subject has little role to play in her model for decision-making.
218 See e.g., ibid. at 37 after a reading of Adorno: "The focus [in Adorno] is less on doing what is
right in accordance with one's duty than on the development of an attitude of tenderness
toward otherness and gentleness toward oneself as a sensual creature." Although Cornell does
approach Adorno critically, her understanding of the ethical relation corresponds with this
reading of Adorno; see ibid. at 89.
219 See Derrida, Points, supra note 76 at 258. See also Peggy Kamuf, "Deconstruction and
Feminism: A Repetition" in Holland supra note 41 at 103 for an excellent (implicit) critique of
Cornell's position in this respect.
220 See Derrida, Rogues, supra note 7 at 152.
221 I am not necessarily accusing Cornell of espousing such a view. I have not read anything where
she states that Derrida authorizes or encourages such readings. In fact, she states in Cornell,
PoL, supra note 1, at 81 that "[d]econstruction does not impose itself upon the text it reads."
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deconstruction - her model for decision-making is presented as if this is
ultimately what Derrida means by deconstruction. There is clearly a difference
between taking a political decision with reference to paradoxical concepts or
principles (which is what responsibility in Derrida's terms requires)m and a
model of decision-making which allows one to take decisions on the basis of
unitary principles without paradox (which is what Cornell's model requires).
In taking decisions in terms of the latter model, we are required only to do the
possible; there is no aporia, no undecidability and therefore no responsibility;
only calculation and narcissism. Presented as "deconstruction," this gives one a
very narrow and skewed view of deconstruction which makes it less politically
powerful and radical than it can potentially be. Deconstruction as presented
by Cornell becomes simply another political project.'m It thereby closes off
the legal system from the event, from justice, from equality without limits,
from what or who remains to come.
222 See in this respect, Derrida's remarks in Derrida, Paper Machine, supra note 39 at 152 on some
of his previous political engagements (including opposing the death penalty and apartheid and
arguing for the freeing of Mandela): "I would like to think that these forms of engagement and
the discourses that supported them were themselves in agreement (it isn't always easy) with the
ongoing work of deconstruction. So I tried to adjust a discourse or a political practice to the
demands of deconstruction, with more or less success, but never enough. I don't feel a divorce
between my writings and my engagements, only differences of rhythm, mode of discourse,
context, and so on."
223 This does not mean that I reject Cornell's politics. I have not read anything in Cornell that I
am not willing to subscribe to as a political practice.
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